We consider the problem of equitably allocating a set of indivisible goods to n agents with additive utilities so as to provide worst case guarantees on agents' utilities. Demko and Hill [6] showed the existence of an allocation where every agent values his share at least V n (α), which is a family of nonincreasing functions of α, defined as the maximum value assigned by an agent to a single good. A deterministic algorithm returning such an allocation in polynomial time was proposed in [15] . Interestingly, V n (α) is tight for some values of α, i.e. it matches the highest possible utility of the least happy agent. However, this is not true for all values of α. We propose a family of functions W n such that W n (x) ≥ V n (x) for all x, and W n (x) > V n (x) for values of x where V n (x) is not tight. The functions W n apply on a problem that generalizes the allocation of indivisible goods. It is to find a base in a matroid which is common to n agents. Our results are constructive, they are achieved by analyzing an extension of the algorithm of Markakis and Psomas. We also present an upper bound on the utility of the least happy agent.
maximum utility for a good was upper bounded by a quantity tending to 0, the indivisible model would gradually tend to the divisible model, where t n = 1/n. Then what is t n between these two extremal cases?
In fact, the maximum value for a single element appears to significantly influence t n , as in the pioneering work of [10] who defines a family of nonincreasing functions V n : [0, 1] → [0, n −1 ] for any integer n ≥ 2 (see Definition 1 and Fig. 1 ).
Following Hill [10] , Demko and Hill [6] consider the parameter α ∈ [0, 1], defined as the maximum value assigned by an agent to a single good, and they show that it is possible to allocate the indivisible goods to n agents such that every agent's valuation for his share is at least V n (α). In addition, they show with some instances that V n is exactly the highest possible utility of the least happy agent for some values of α, but the instances do not cover the entire interval [0, 1] .
Defining α i as agent i's maximum valuation for a single item, Markakis and Psomas [15] have recently strengthened the result of Demko and Hill. Indeed, they show the existence of an allocation guaranteeing V n (α i ) for every agent i. Since V n is nonincreasing, V n (α i ) ≥ V n (α) holds and the vector (V n (α i )) i∈ [n] weakly Pareto dominates (V n (α)) i∈ [n] . The other contribution of Markakis and Psomas relies on the fact that, unlike the results in [10, 6] , the allocation is obtained with a deterministic algorithm which runs in polynomial time.
Our work deals with a problem which encompasses the allocation of indivisible goods. It is a problem on a matroid (defined in Section 3) where one has to find a common solution (base) to n agents. The agents have possibly different utilities for the elements of the matroid, and an agent's utility for a solution B is defined as the sum of individual utilities for the elements in B. After a normalization ensuring that the maximum utility for a solution of the matroid is exactly 1 for everyone, we define α i as the maximum value that agent i assigns to a single element, and α = max i∈ [n] α i .
Interestingly, we show that V n is still valid in this generalized context and we can even improve it. We propose a family of functions W n : [0, 1] → [0, n −1 ] defined for any positive integer n. We have W n (x) ≥ V n (x) for all x ∈ [0, 1] , and W n (x) > V n (x) for values of x where V n (x) is not tight (see Fig. 2 for illustration). Like V n , W n is piecewise linear on [0, 1] but unlike V n , W n alternates decreasing and increasing phases. This gives a new insight in the particularity of handling indivisible objects.
We also propose a deterministic algorithm which is an extension of the one in [15] for the generalized problem on matroids. The algorithm returns a solution (a base) where every agent i has utility at least W n (α i ). In the case of n = 2 agents, a slight modification of this algorithm allows to obtain a base with utility at least max{W 2 (α 1 ), W 2 (α 2 )} for both
agents. An upper bound on the utility of the least happy agent is also presented. Together with the lower bound, an accurate estimation of t n can be derived. In all, our contribution consists in dealing with matroids which capture more situations than the basic model of allocating indivisible goods, the new functions W n improve on V n , and the solution is built by a polynomial time deterministic algorithm.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss some related work. In order to be self-contained, we give basic notions on matroids in Section 3. Section 4 introduces the model that we deal with. Section 5 presents the functions V n and W n . In Section 6, we present a polynomial time algorithm which provides a base of a matroid such that the utility of each agent i is at least W n (α i ). Then, in Section 7, we present a slight modification of this algorithm in the case of n = 2 agents in order to guarantee at least max{W 2 (α 1 ), W 2 (α 2 )} for both agents. In Section 8, we give an upper bound on the utility of the least happy agent and we conclude on the value of the threshold t n in Section 8.1. The conclusion and some future directions are given in Section 9.
Matroids
Matroid theory is central in combinatorial optimization. In particular, it has permitted to unify apparently separated structures like trees and matchings in a graph. In order to be selfcontained, we give some basic notions on matroids. An interested reader may consult [19, 13, 17] for more details.
A matroid M = (X, F ) consists of a finite set of elements X and a collection F of subsets of X where:
(i) ∅ ∈ F ; (ii) if F 2 ⊆ F 1 and F 1 ∈ F then F 2 ∈ F ; (iii) for every F 1 , F 2 ∈ F where |F 1 | < |F 2 |, there exists e ∈ F 2 \F 1 such that F 1 ∪ {e} ∈ F .
The elements of F are called independent sets. Inclusionwise maximal independent sets are called bases. All bases of a matroid M have the same cardinality r(M), defined as the rank of M. Given a matroid M = (X, F ) and a subset X ⊂ X , if X ∈ F then the contraction of M by X , denoted by M/X , is the structure (X \ X , F ) where F = {F ⊆ X \ X : F ∪ X ∈ F }. It is well-known that M/X is a matroid.
A typical example of a matroid is the forests (acyclic set of edges) of a multigraph G, usually called the graphic matroid. The bases are the spanning trees if G is connected.
Another example is the partition matroid: given k disjoint sets X 1 , . . . , X k which form a ground set X = ∪ k i=1 X i and k nonnegative integers b i (i = 1, . . . , k), the sets F ⊆ X satisfying |F ∩ X i | ≤ b i form a matroid. Notably (and it is crucial in the present work), allocating a set of m indivisible items to n agents can be seen as a partition matroid.
Build m sets X i = {e A generalization of the partition matroid is the laminar matroid. A family L of subsets of X is a laminar if for all A, B ∈ L, one of the following cases occurs: F ) is the laminar matroid. A possible application of the laminar matroid is the formation of a group representing a large community structured as a hierarchy and such that the number of members of each unit of the hierarchy is fixed. For example, the trade union (labor union) of a company is formed by a group of workers of various units (services). The number of members from each unit is fixed. For instance, let L = {Corporate (L), Risk management (RM)} be the set of units of the company such that A ⊂ CF, L ⊂ FM, RM ⊂ FM, and the intersection of any other pair of units is empty, so L defines a laminar family. Let X be the set of the workers of the company and b(U ) a nonnegative integer representing the number of members in the unit U ∈ L for the trade union. A base of the laminar matroid is a trade union of the company containing b(U ) members of each unit U ∈ L. Some other applications of the laminar matroid are given in [11, 7] .
The last example is the matching matroid defined over a graph G = (V , E). Take X = V and define F as the subsets of V that can be covered by a matching of G. An example on the matching matroid is given at the end of Section 4.
When every element e ∈ X has a weight w(e) ∈ R, a classical optimization problem consists in computing a base B ∈ F that maximizes e∈B w(e). This problem is solved by the well-known greedy algorithm (a.k.a. Kruskal's algorithm for the maximum weight spanning tree problem) described in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: greedy.
The time complexity of matroid algorithms depends of the difficulty of testing if a set F ∈ F . This is usually done by a dedicated subroutine called the independence oracle. The complexity of greedy is O (|X| max{ln |X|, θ}) where θ is the complexity of the independence oracle. θ is not given explicitly, it depends on the matroid under consideration. In our study, we suppose that θ is a polynomial (otherwise the problem would not be in NP), so greedy is efficient.
Matroids satisfy the following fact that we use in Section 6.
Fact 1.
Let M = (X, F ) be a matroid and w : X → R + a weight function such that w( X ) = e∈ X w(e), ∀X ⊆ X. Given
The existence of set E in Fact 1 comes from a repeated application of property (iii) of matroids on F 1 ∪ E and F 2 (initially, E = ∅). 
The model
We are given a matroid M = (X, F ), a set of agents N = {1, . . . , n} and a utility u i (e) ∈ R + for every pair (i, e) ∈ N × X . Actually, u i (e) is the utility of agent i for the element e. With a slight abuse of notation, the utility of an agent i ∈ N for a subset X of X is denoted by u i (X ) and defined as x∈ X u i (x). As a convention, u i (∅) is equal to 0.
A feasible solution is a base of the matroid and our objective is to find a tradeoff solution, i.e. a common base for the agents with worst case guarantees on agents' utilities. for all e ∈ X . This is trivially done in polynomial time.
Throughout the article, we use α i = max {e}∈F u i (e), the maximal utility that agent i has for an element of the matroid and α = max i∈N α i , the maximal utility assigned to an element of the matroid, over all agents.
Following Demko and Hill [6] , we are interested in determining a value t n such that, in any case, there exists a solution B ∈ F satisfying u i (B) ≥ t n , ∀i ∈ N. As done in [15] , a strengthening of this result would be a vector t i,n i∈N such that, in any case, there exists a solution B of the matroid with u i (B)
Since our model extends the one in [6, 15] , parameters α and α i play an important role in the determination of t n and t i,n i∈N .
In Section 3, we have seen that the allocation of indivisible goods is a specific case of our model. A possible application of the matroid model, that allocation of indivisible goods cannot cover, is the following: consider a bipartite graph (A ∪ T , E) whose node sets A and T correspond to a set of activities and a set of time slots, respectively. At most one activity can be scheduled during a time slot and there is an edge (a, t) ∈ E if and only if activity a is available during time slot t. It is possible to schedule a subset of activities A if there exists a matching covering A . As mentioned in Section 3, the subsets of A for which a feasible schedule exists, form a matroid. In the presence of n agents having heterogeneous utilities for the activities, it is relevant to seek for a common set of activities that is feasible and fair.
The functions V n and W n
The family of functions V n was initially introduced by Hill [10] for some probability measures. 
where for any integer p ≥ 1,
. For instance, for n = 2 and p = 1, we have I(2, 1) = 2 3 , 1 and the function V 2 (x) = 1 − x is decreasing. For NI(2, 1) = 1 3 , 2 3 , the function V 2 (x) = 1 3 is constant. A graphic representation of V n is given for n = 2 and n = 3 in Fig. 1 1] , whereas for any integer n ≥ 2, W n (x) = 1/n for x = 0 and for x > 0,
Definition 2. Given any integer
where
We observe that the functions V n and W n cover entirely interval [0, 1] of possible arguments of the function by considering the whole set of integers p ≥ 1.
Note that I (n,p) = I(n, p). In the rest of the article, we use only the intervals defined in Definition 2. We see that W n is a piecewise linear function, decreasing on I 1 (n,p) and I
2
(n,p) , and increasing on I
3
(n,p) . Fig. 2 contains a graphic representation of the functions W n and V n for n = 2 and n = 3. Let us present some properties of the functions W n whose proofs are in Appendix A.
Property 1. Given any integers n
≥ 2 and p ≥ 1, for all x ∈ [0, 1], V n (x) ≤ W n (x) ≤ 1 n . Property 2. Given any integer n ≥ 2, if x ≤ p+1 p((p+1)n−1) for some integer p ≥ 1, then W n (x) ≥ p (p+1)n−1 . Property 3. Given any integer n ≥ 2, if x ∈ I (n,p) for some integer p ≥ 1, then (p − 1)x < W n (x) ≤ px.
Algorithm THRESHOLD
We present a polynomial time deterministic algorithm denoted by threshold (see Algorithm 2) which constructs a base (a solution) of a matroid which is common to n agents. The solution is obtained by executing threshold(N, M, (u i ) i∈N , ∅).
Algorithm 2: threshold.
threshold is an adaptation of the algorithm of [15] on matroids. The algorithm is recursive on the number of agents n. Each iteration of threshold consists in choosing one agent i who adds some elements to the solution in order to ensure himself the guarantee W n (α i ). Agent i tries to reach the guarantee W n (α i ) with a minimum number of elements. Then we choose an agent who uses the smallest number of elements to be sure that the remaining set of elements is enough for the other agents in the next iterations. The union of elements over all iterations forms a base of the matroid.
threshold sorts the set X in O (|X| ln |X|) for each agent i, then tests the independence of adding elements of X to the solution, which is done in O (θ|X|), where θ is the complexity of the independence oracle. Since we repeat these steps n times (the induction), the complexity of threshold is O n 2 |X| max{ln |X|, θ} .
In the rest of the paper, we always assume that agent i has been selected during the i-th call of threshold. Thus, Let us give an example on the application of threshold. Example 1. Consider a set of agents N = {1, 2} and the graphic matroid defined over a connected graph G = (V , E), illustrated by Fig. 3 . The aim is to find a common base to 2 agents with a guarantee on the utility of each one. In the graphic matroid of G, a base corresponds to a spanning tree. We use the graphic matroid to better illustrate the notions of base, independent set, contraction, etc. During the first call of threshold, we have B *
where B * i corresponds to a maximum spanning tree in (G, u i ) (for example, by applying greedy or Kruskal's algorithm). The algorithm normalizes utilities
. Now, each agent i ∈ {1, 2} builds a forest S i by adding, in a greedy manner, the heaviest edges of
Now, let G/B 1 be the new graph obtained by contracting edge (v 1 , v 2 ) of B 1 into vertex v 1,2 as it is done in Fig. 4 . The utilities of agent 1 are omitted because he has already chosen his edges. Recall that the second agent's utility has been normalized during the first call of thresholdũ 2 (e) = 
The following example illustrates how W n outperforms V n .
Example 2.
Consider the partition matroid M = (X, F ) defined by X = ∪ i∈ [4] X i such that X i = {e
. This matroid models the problem of allocating indivisible goods such that there are 4 goods and 2 agents. The aim is to find a base which corresponds to an allocation so that if an element e j i is selected in the base then good i is allocated to agent j, for i ∈ {1, . . . , 4} and j ∈ {1, 2}. Agents' utilities are presented in Table 1 . Table 1 Agents' utilities of Example 2.
The base B * j = {e
} is optimal for agent j with u j (B * j ) = 1 for j = 1, 2, so the instance is normalized. Thus,
The following theorem represents our main result and provides a guarantee on the use of threshold for finding a solution of our problem on matroids.
Theorem 1. threshold returns a base B satisfying u i (B) ≥
Proof. Let n = |N| and recall that the base returned by threshold is B = B 1 ∪ · · · ∪ B n . Actually, we prove a stronger result by induction on n:
Because the utilities are nonnegative, we conclude that u i (B) ≥ u i (B i ). For n = 1, Line 7 of threshold is equivalent to apply greedy(M, u 1 ) to get the base B = B 1 = B * 1 that satisfies:
Let n ≥ 2. We assume that r(M) ≥ n because otherwise all bases have size at most n − 1 and then ∀i ∈ N, α i ≥ 1/(n − 1). In this case, ∀i ∈ N, W n (α i ) = 0 and the result is trivially satisfied. For similar reasons, we assume that α i < 1/(n − 1), ∀i ∈ N because otherwise for any agent i with α i ≥ 1/(n − 1), we get that W n (α i ) = 0 and the bound of this agent i is clearly satisfied.
Without loss of generality, we assume that agent 1 has been selected first, so B 1 = S 1 and by Line 8 of threshold,
In order to avoid confusion between the notations during the first and the second calls of threshold, we add a tilde for the notations used during the second call of threshold (like it is done in Example 1).
The inductive hypothesis affirms that
and we want to show that
By the construction of threshold, during the first call we have (Lines 3-7)
Since B 1 = S 1 , then by Inequality (3), we get the expected result for agent 1. In addition, the sets S i = e 
). Due to the normalization, we get that
From (5) and (6), it holds that
and by (2) and (7),
Now, from Line 5 of threshold, we know that
By (7), the last inequality becomes
with (3). We distinguish two cases: (10) and by (9) ,
. By
if and only if
Let us prove that p k ≥ 2. By contradiction, assume that
) for the following reasons: |S k | ≥ p k + 1, the elements of S k are sorted by nonincreasing order of ũ k and ũ k (e
(because S k is sorted by nonincreasing order of ũ k ). Finally, by adding the last inequality of ũ k (e
On the one hand, by (8) and (12) we havẽ
On the other hand, by (9) and (12) we get that (14) Let us analyze the different cases according to the values of α k in
On the other hand, by (14) we get that
is always true. Hence,
On the one hand, by (13) ,
On the other hand, by (14) ,
if and only if (n − 1)p k + n − 2 ≥ 0 which is true since n ≥ 3 and p k ≥ 2. Hence,
Using Property 2 if n ≥ 3 with (19) 
. On the one hand, by (13) ,
is always true because the last inequality is equivalent to np
which is valid for n, p k ≥ 2. Hence,
The induction is proved and the result follows. 2
The analysis of the algorithm threshold is tight i.e., there are instances in which the utility of the least happy agent of the solution returned by threshold is the same as the one given by Theorem 1. These instances are presented in Appendix A. 4 .
In some multi-agent systems, the agents might possibly misreport their utilities in order to get better guaranties. Mechanism design deals with this problem and the aim is often to incite the agents to declare their truthful utility functions. An algorithm A is said to be truthful if the declaration of truthful utility functions by the agents is a dominant strategy, i.e. for any instance (N, M, (u i ) i∈N ) and any other possible utility function u k of any agent k, we have u k (B) ≥ u k (B ) where B (B resp.) is the solution returned by A for the instance (N, M, (u i ) i∈N ) ((N, M, ((u i ) i∈N\{k} , u k ) ) resp.). Hence, agent k has no interest to misreport his utility function [14, 15] . threshold is not truthful. As a counter-example, consider the instance presented in Example 2 and assume that agent 1 declares a new utility function denoted by u 1 with u 1 (e 
A slight modification of THRESHOLD for 2 agents
When n = 2 agents, we propose a new algorithm denoted by max-threshold which allows to improve the guarantee of the least happy agent compared to the one given by threshold. max-threshold is obtained by modifying the value of the threshold that every agent must reach. The selection method of the agent who adds its elements first in the solution is also modified. max-threshold is described in Algorithm 3.
max-threshold provides a guarantee of max{W 2 (α 1 ), W 2 (α 2 )} to both agents. 
Theorem 2. If n = 2 agents then max-threshold produces a base B with
Proof. Equivalently, by Line 4 of max-threshold, we want to prove that
Without loss of generality, we suppose that i = 1 at Line 9 of max-threshold. Thus,
In addition, Line 8 of max-threshold ensures that agent 1 reaches the guarantee max{W 2 (α 1 ), W 2 (α 2 )}. Since S 1 ⊆ B and by the nonnegativity of ũ 1 , we conclude that ũ 1 (B)
Now, we focus on agent 2. Let S 2 be the independent set produced by greedy(M/S 1 , ũ 2 ) at Line 10 of max-threshold.
Let us study the two scenarios that may occur at Line 9.
• 2 (B 2 ). E is an independent set of M/S 1 maximum for ũ 2 whereas S 2 (obtained by applying greedy(M/S 1 , ũ 2 )) is a base of M/S 1 maximum for ũ 2 . Hence, 
Using the same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 1, we know that |S 1 | < |B * 2 | (it can easily be proved by contradiction). Hence, we can apply Fact 1 for M, w =ũ 2 , F 1 = S 1 and F 2 = B * 2 . We deduce that there exists
. E is an independent set of M/S 1 maximum for ũ 2 whereas S 2 (obtained by applying greedy(M/S 1 , ũ 2 )) is a base of M/S 1 maximum for ũ 2 . Hence,
2 ). Finally, from (23), we get that
where the last inequality holds if and only if max{W 2 
which is true by Property 1.
In both cases, ũ 2 (S 2 ) ≥ max{W 2 (α 1 ), W 2 (α 2 )}. Using the nonnegativity of ũ 2 , we conclude that ũ 2 (B)
Note that max-threshold is also non-truthful by using the same counter-example as the one of threshold (see the end of Section 6).
Upper bound on the utility of the least happy agent
The positive results given in Sections 6 and 7 rely on the vector (α i ) i∈ [n] . Due to numerous values that the vector (α i ) i∈ [n] can take, we restrict our upper bound to the least happy agent and we express this bound as a function of α = max i∈N α i and n.
We are looking for some instances that provide this upper bound denoted by W n (α) which represents the maximum utility the least happy agent can have and it is calculated as follows: (24) where B is the set of bases of the matroid.
All the instances given in this section use graphic matroids where a base corresponds to a spanning tree. We say that an instance is well defined if for every edge e of the corresponding graph, α ≥ u i (e) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N. We assume that all the instances are normalized.
We obtain the following results depending on the values of α ∈ [0, 1].
there is no guarantee as we can see on the following instances of the graphic matroid depending of n = 2 or n ≥ 3. (a) If n = 2 then consider the multigraph below:
Since the graph is connected, a feasible solution (a spanning tree) consists of one of the two edges. The utility of the least happy agent is min{0, 1} = 0, so 
•
n } be an optimal spanning tree for each agent i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Each edge of the instance has a positive utility just for one agent. Since a spanning tree contains n edges, we have to choose n edges {(i, i + 1), i = 1, . . . , n − 1}. One of spanning trees that maximizes the utility of the least happy agent is T = {e
as we can see on the following instance:
and u i (e j k ) = 0 otherwise. The instance is well defined for the following reasons:
• α ≥ The spanning tree T = {e 
• α ≥ 
for some integer p ≥ 2 then W n (α) = 1 − p(n −1)α as we can see on the following instance: , it follows that • α ≥ 
Conclusion on the value of t n
We have seen in the introduction that the value t n ∈ [0, 1] represents the maximum utility that each agent can obtain. In this section, we conclude on the value of t n by taking account of the lower bound given by threshold or max-threshold, and the upper bound W n (α) presented above where α = max i∈[n] α i .
The value of t 2
When n = 2 agents, we have seen in Section 7 that max{W 2 (α 1 ), W 2 (α 2 )} is a lower bound on the utility of the least happy agent produced by max-threshold, whereas W 2 (α) is an upper bound on the utility of the least happy agent. In order to compare these two bounds and because W is non-monotonic, we suppose that α 1 = α 2 = α, so
The difference between the upper and the lower bounds is illustrated in Fig. 5 . 2,p) where p ≥ 2 is an integer.
The value of t n for n ≥ 3 agents
When n ≥ 3, we have seen in Section 6 that W n (α i ) is a lower bound of the utility of agent i produced by threshold. Since W n is non-monotonic, we can not conclude on the validity of the guarantee W n (α) for every agent because, even if α = max i∈ [n] α i , we can not say anything on W n (α) compared to W n (α i ). Thus, in order to compare the guarantee W n (α i ) to the upper bound W n (α) for n ≥ 3, we suppose that α = α i , ∀i ∈ N. Table 2 presents a summary of lower and upper bounds on the utility of the least happy agent as functions of α when α = α i , ∀i ∈ N. Table 2 Upper and lower bounds on the utility of the least happy agent.
The lower bound W n (α)
As we observe in Table 2 
(n,p) for every integer p ≥ 2. Demko and Hill [6] and Markakis and Psomas [15] have shown that the guarantee V n (α) is tight only on I 1 (n,p) for every integers n ≥ 2 and p ≥ 1 (the decreasing segments of the function V n in Fig. 1 ).
Conclusion and future directions
threshold algorithm provides a solution which is a base B of a matroid with a relative utility of at least W n (α i ) for each agent i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and for any number of agents n ≥ 1. This guarantee satisfies for every integers n ≥ 2 and
given in [15] on the utility of agent i for the problem of allocating indivisible goods with additive utilities. The guarantee (W n (α i )) i∈ [n] is valid for the generalized problem on matroids which contains the allocation of indivisible goods.
We have seen in Section 8.1.2 that the value t n , representing the utility that every agent can obtain, is not reached for all values of α i ∈ [0, 1]. A first direction is to reduce the gap between the lower and upper bounds. We do not conjecture that these bounds are the best.
Unlike V n , W n is non-monotonic. This fact is due to the use of discrete/indivisible elements, so it is not obvious that we may guarantee a relative utility of W n (α) for every agent. However, for n = 2 agents, the application of max-threshold (see Section 7) allows to provide a guarantee of at least max{W 2 (α 1 ), W 2 (α 2 )} for every agent i ∈ N = {1, 2}. An interesting challenge is to know if a bound of max i∈N W n (α i ) for each agent i ∈ N can be reached when n ≥ 3.
threshold and max-threshold are not truthful. It is not surprising since [15] show, for the worst-case allocation of indivisible goods, the non-existence of deterministic truthful mechanisms that can guarantee an allocation that is worth at least 2 3 V n (α i ) for every agent i, even in the case of two agents. As an alternative of truthfulness, one might be interested in multi-agent systems where the utility functions of the agents are not public (private). This is done in [9] where a guarantee of Another perspective is to study the same approach for a more general structure like matroid intersection. 
A.4. Tightness of threshold
We present a family of instances in which the solution produced by threshold is tight (not underemphasized). By tightness, we mean that the utility of the least happy agent of the solution returned by threshold is the same as the one given by Theorem 1.
The family of instances is taken from the graphic matroid where a base corresponds to a spanning tree. These instances satisfy α 1 = · · · = α n = α and we say that an instance is well defined if for every edge e of the corresponding graph, α ≥ u i (e) ≥ 0. All the instances are normalized, so we want to show that for all α ∈ [0, 1], the solution B returned by threshold for these instances satisfies min i∈ [n] 
, 1 , we have seen that there is no guarantee i.e. W n (α) = 0. Thus, let us present the tight instances depending on the values of α ∈ 0,
for some integers n ≥ 2 and p ≥ 1 then threshold gives 
> 0 because n ≥ 2 and p ≥ 1; 
for some integers n ≥ 2 and p ≥ 1. We consider two different instances depending on whether n = 2 or n ≥ 3. • α ≥ 1 − (2p − 1)α if and only if α ≥ • α ≥ for some integers n ≥ 2 and p ≥ 1. We consider two different instances depending on whether n = 2 or n ≥ 3. The instance is well defined for the following reasons:
• α ≥ • α ≥
